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Abstract. We investigate the extension of Monadic Second Order logic, interpreted over
infinite words and trees, with generalized “for almost all” quantifiers interpreted using the
notions of Baire category and Lebesgue measure.
1. Introduction
Monadic Second Order logic (MSO) is an extension of first order logic (FO) allowing
quantification over subsets of the domain (∀X.φ) and including a membership predicate
between elements of the domain and its subsets (x ∈ X). Two fundamental results about
MSO, due to Bu¨chi and Rabin respectively, state that the MSO theories of (N, <) and of
the full binary tree (see Section 3 for precise definitions) are decidable.
A different kind of extension of first order logic which has been studied in the literature,
starting from the seminal works of Mostowski [21], is by means of generalized quantifiers. A
typical example is the “there exists infinitely many” quantifier:
M |= ∃∞x. φ ⇐⇒ the set {m ∈M | φ(m)} is infinite.
The formula ¬(∃∞x. (x = x)) holds only on finite models and is therefore not expressible
in first order logic. Hence, in general, FO ( FO + ∃∞. Note however that on some fixed
structures the logic FO and FO + ∃∞ may have the same expressive power. This is the case,
for example, for the structure (N, <).
It is natural to try to merge the two approaches and consider extensions of MSO with
generalized quantifiers. In this context, one can consider generalized first order quantifiers
as well as generalized second order quantifiers. For example, the second order generalized
quantifier (∃∞X.φ) has the following meaning:
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M |= ∃∞X.φ ⇐⇒ the set {A ⊆M | φ(A)} is infinite.
The topic of MSO with generalized second order quantifiers is not new. In particular,
Bojan´czyk in 2004 ([3]) has initiated an investigation of the unbounding quantifier (UX.φ)
M |= UX.φ ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ N. ∃A ⊆M. (A is finite, |A| ≥ n, φ(A)).
It was shown recently that the MSO + U theory of (N, <) is undecidable [7].
Ba´ra´ny, Kaiser and Rabinovich have investigated in [2] the second order quantifier ∃∞
mentioned above and also the cardinality quantifier ∃c defined as:
M |= ∃cX.φ⇐⇒ the set {A ⊆M | φ(A)} has cardinality c = 2ℵ0 .
Interestingly it was shown that, on the structures (N, <) and the full binary tree, the
quantifiers ∃∞ and ∃c can be eliminated. That is, to each formula of MSO + ∃c + ∃∞
corresponds (effectively) a semantically equivalent formula of MSO.
In a series of manuscripts in the late 70’s (see [25] for an overview) H. Friedman
investigated two kinds of first-order generalized quantifiers called (Baire) Category quantifier
(∀∗) and (full probability) Measure quantifier (∀=1), respectively.
The goal of this article is to collect recent results (from [18], [19] and [20]) regarding
extensions of MSO with second order Category and Measure quantifiers. The meaning of
such second order quantifiers is given as follows:
M |= ∀∗X.φ⇐⇒ the set {A ⊆M | φ(A)} is comeager.
and
M |= ∀=1X.φ⇐⇒ the set {A ⊆M | φ(A)} has Lebesgue measure 1.
We will exclusively be interested in the properties of MSO+∀∗ and MSO+∀=1 interpreted
over the two fundamental structures (N, <) and the full binary tree. Therefore, the domain
of M is always countable and the space of subsets A ⊆ M is a copy of the Cantor space
2ω where the notions of (co)meager sets and Lebesgue (i.e., coin-flipping) measure are well
defined. See Section 2 for precise definitions.
Results regarding S1S. By denoting with S1S the MSO theory of (N, <) we prove
(Theorem 4.1) that the Category quantifier (∀∗) can be (effectively) eliminated. Therefore
S1S+∀∗ = S1S and its theory is decidable. On the other hand, the addition of the Measure
quantifier (∀=1) leads to an undecidable theory (Theorem 5.2). This was proved in [18] using
recent results from the theory of probabilistic automata. In this article we give a different
proof of undecidability of S1S + ∀=1 based on an interpretation of Bojan´czyk’s undecidable
theory S1S + U.
Results regarding S2S. By denoting with S2S the MSO theory of the full binary tree,
the theory of S1S + ∀=1 can be interpreted within S2S + ∀=1. As a consequence S2S + ∀=1
has an undecidable theory (Theorem 7.1).
In [18] it was claimed that the theory S2S + ∀∗ is effectively equivalent to S2S. The
proof relied on an automata-based quantifier elimination procedure. Unfortunately, the
proof contains a crucial mistake which we do not know how to fix. The mistake is caused
by a wrong citation in Proposition 1: although the automaton A∃ recognizes the language
∃X.φ(X, #»Y ), this may not be the case for the automaton A∀ and the language ∀X.φ(X, #»Y ).
Because of that, the automaton Aψ constructed in Definition 6 does not fairly simulate the
Banach–Mazur game in the moves of the universal player ∀.
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The proof technique adopted in [18], while faulty in the general case, leads to the following
weaker result (Theorem 6.1): if φ(X, ~Y ) is a S2S formula (with parameters X, ~Y ) definable
by a game automaton, then the quantifier ∀∗X.φ(X, ~Y ) can be effectively eliminated. That
is, there (effectively) exists a S2S formula ψ(~Y ) equivalent to ∀∗X.φ(X, ~Y ). Comparing to
the proof presented in [18], the proof in this paper is shorter and more precise.
The question of whether the full logic S2S + ∀∗ has a decidable theory remains open
from this work. See the list of open problems in Section 10.
Results regarding S2S with generalized path quantifiers. Another interesting way
to extend S2S with variants of Friedman’s Category and Measure quantifiers is to restrict
the quantification to range over infinite branches (paths) of the full binary tree. This leads to
the definition of the path-Category (∀∗piX.φ) and the path-Measure (∀=1pi X.φ) second-order
quantifiers.
A path pi in the full binary tree is an infinite set of vertices which can be uniquely
identified with an infinite set of direction pi ∈ {L, R}ω. By denoting with P the collection
{L, R}ω we define:
∀∗piX.φ⇐⇒ {pi ∈ P | φ(pi)} is comeager as a subset of P
and
∀=1pi X.φ⇐⇒ {pi ∈ P | φ(pi)} has measure 1 as a subset of P
We show that the path-Category quantifier can be (effectively) eliminated so that
S2S + ∀∗pi ≡ S2S. On the other hand, we show that S2S + ∀=1pi ) S2S is a strict extension
of S2S. The question of whether S2S + ∀=1pi has a decidable theory remains open from this
work. See the list of open problems in Section 10.
Related Work. A significant amount of work has been devoted to the study of properties
of regular sets of words and infinite trees with respect to Baire Category and probability.
For example, a remarkable result of Staiger ([24, Theorem 4]) states that a regular set
L⊆Σω of ω-words is comeager if and only if µ(L) = 1, where µ is the probability (coin
flipping) measure on ω-words. Furthermore the probability µ(L) can be easily computed
by an algorithm based on linear programming and it is always a rational number (see, e.g.,
Theorem 2 of [11]). Staiger’s theorem was rediscovered by Varacca and Vo¨lzer and has been
used to develop a theory of fairness for reactive systems [27].
In another direction, Gra¨edel have investigated determinacy, definability, and complexity
issues of Banach–Mazur games played on graphs [13]. Our results regarding S1S + ∀∗ are
closely related to the results of Gra¨edel.
The study of Category and Measure properties of regular sets of infinite trees happens
to be more complicated. Indeed, due to their high topological complexity, it is not even
clear if such sets are Baire-measurable and Lebesgue measurable. These properties were
established only recently (see [14] for Baire measurability and [12] for Lebesgue measurability).
Furthermore, it has been shown in [19] that the equivalent of Staiger’s theorem fails for
infinite trees. That is, there exist comeager regular sets of trees having probability 0.
The problem of computing the probability of a regular set of infinite trees is still open in
the literature. An algorithm for computing the (generally irrational) probability of regular
sets definable by game automata is presented in [19] but a solution for the general case is
still unknown (and the problem could be undecidable). The result of Theorem 6.1 proved in
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this article imply that it is possible to determine the Baire category of regular sets definable
by game automata. A solution to the general case is unknown.
All the results mentioned above contribute to the theory of regular sets of ω-words (S1S
definable) and infinite trees (S2S definable). The novelty of the approach followed in this
research is instead to augment the base logic (S1S or S2S) with generalized quantifiers
capable of expressing properties related to Baire category and probability, and to study such
logical extensions.
Interestingly, a different but related approach has been explored by Carayol, Haddad
and Serre in [8] (see also [9, 10] and the habilitation thesis [23]). Rather than extending
the base logic, it is the base (Rabin) tree automata model which is modified. The usual
acceptance condition “there exists a run such that all paths are accepting” is replaced by
the weaker “there exists a run such that almost all paths are accepting“. When almost all
is interpreted as “for a set of measure 1”, this results in the notion of qualitative automata
of [8]. The connections between this automata-oriented and our logic-oriented approach is
further discussed in Section 9.
Addendum: after the submission of this article, we have been informed by M. Bojan´czyk
that a proof of the decidability of the theory of weakS2S + ∀=1pi , the fragment of S2S + ∀=1pi
where second-order quantification is restricted to finite sets, can be obtained from the results
of [4, 6].
2. Technical Background
In this section we give the basic definitions regarding descriptive set theory, probability
measures and tree automata that are needed in this work.
The set of natural numbers and their standard total order are denoted by the symbols ω
and <, respectively. Given sets X and Y we denote with XY the space of functions X → Y .
We can view elements of XY as Y -indexed sequences {xi}i∈Y of elements of X. Given a
finite set Σ, we refer to Σω as the collection of ω-words over Σ. The collection of finite
sequences of elements in Σ is denoted by Σ∗. As usual we denote with  the empty sequence
and with ww′ the concatenation of w,w′ ∈ Σ∗. The prefix order on sequences is denoted 
i.e., u  w if u is a prefix of w.
We identify finite sequences {L, R}∗ as vertices of the infinite full binary tree so that  is
the root and each vertex w ∈ {L, R}∗ has wL and wR as children. We denote by TΣ the set
Σ{L,R}∗ of functions labelling each vertex with an element in Σ. Elements t ∈ TΣ are called
trees over Σ.
2.1. Games. In this paper we work with games of perfect information and infinite duration
commonly referred to as Gale–Stewart games. In what follows we provide the basic definitions.
We refer to [16, Chapter 20.A] for a detailed overview.
Gale–Stewart games are played between two players: Player ∃ and Player ∀. A game
is given by a set of configurations V ; an initial configuration v0 ∈ V ; a winning condition
W ⊆ V ω; and a definition of a round. A round starts in a configuration vn; then players
perform a fixed sequence of choices; and depending on these choices the round ends in a new
configuration vn+1. Each game specifies what are the exact choices available to the players
and how the successive configuration vn+1 depends on the decisions made.
A play of such a game is an infinite sequence of configurations v0, v1, . . . where the
configuration vn+1 is a possible outcome of the n-th round that starts in a configuration vn.
MONADIC SECOND ORDER LOGIC WITH MEASURE AND CATEGORY QUANTIFIERS 5
A play is winning for Player ∃ if it satisfies the winning condition (i.e. (v0, v1, . . .) ∈ W );
otherwise the play is winning for Player ∀. A strategy of a player is a function that assigns
to each finite sequence of configurations (v0, v1, . . . , vn) a way of resolving the choices of that
player in the consecutive n-th round that starts in vn. A play is consistent with a strategy if
it can be obtained following that strategy. A strategy of a player is winning if all the plays
consistent with that strategy are winning for the player. We say that a game is determined
if one of the players has a winning strategy.
2.2. Topology. Our exposition of topological and set–theoretical notions follows [16].
The set {0, 1}ω endowed with the product topology (where {0, 1} is given the discrete
topology) is called the Cantor space. The Cantor space is a Polish space (i.e., a complete
separable metric space) and is zero-dimensional (i.e., it has a basis of clopen sets). Given a
finite set Σ with at least two elements, the spaces Σω and TΣ are both homeomorphic to the
Cantor space.
A subset A ⊆ X of a topological space is nowhere dense if the interior of its closure is
the empty set, that is (int(cl(A)) = ∅. A set A ⊆ X is of (Baire) first category (or meager)
if A can be expressed as countable union of nowhere dense sets. A set A ⊆ X which is not
meager is of the second (Baire) category. The complement of a meager set is called comeager.
Recall that a set A ⊆ {0, 1}ω is a Gδ set if it can be expressed as a countable intersection of
open sets. The following property of comeager sets will be useful. A subset B ⊆ {0, 1}ω is
comeager if and only if there exists a dense Gδ set A ⊆ B which is comeager.
A set B ⊆ X has the Baire property if X = U4M , for some open set U ⊆ X and meager
set M ⊆ X, where 4 is the operation of symmetric difference X4Y = (X ∪ Y ) \ (X ∩ Y ).
We now describe Banach–Mazur game (see [16, Chapter 8.H] for a detailed overview)
which characterizes Baire category. We specialize the game to zero–dimensional Polish
spaces, such as Σω and TΣ, since we only deal with this class of spaces in this work.
Definition 2.1 (Banach–Mazur Game). Let X be a zero–dimensional Polish space. Fix a
payoff set A ⊆ X. The configurations of the game BM(X,A) are non-empty clopen sets
U ⊆ X; the initial configuration is X. Consider a round starting in a configuration Un. In
such a round, first Player ∀ chooses a non-empty clopen set U ′n ⊆ Un and then Player ∃
chooses a non-empty clopen set Un+1 ⊆ U ′n. The consecutive configuration is Un+1. An
infinite play of that game is won by Player ∃ if
⋂
n∈ω
Un ∩A 6= ∅ and Player ∀ wins otherwise.
The standard way of defining that game is to represent it as a form of a Gale–Stewart
game.
Player ∀ U ′0 U ′1 . . .
Player ∃ U1 U2 . . .
For a proof of the following result see, e.g., Theorem 8.33 in [16].
Theorem 2.2. Let X be a zero–dimensional Polish space. If A ⊆ X has the Baire property,
then BM(X,A) is determined and Player ∃ wins iff A is comeager.
If X is the space of ω-words or infinite trees over a finite alphabet Σ, the above game
can be simplified as in Definitions 2.3 and 2.4 below.
Definition 2.3. Fix a language L ⊆ Σω of ω-words over Σ. The Banach–Mazur game on L
(denoted BM(L)) is the following game with configurations of the form (s, r) where s ∈ Σ∗
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is a finite word and r ∈ {∃,∀}. The initial configuration (s0, r0) is (,∀). Consider a round
n = 0, 1, . . . that starts in a configuration (sn, rn). In this round, the player rn chooses a
finite word sn+1 that contains sn as a strict prefix and the round ends in the configuration
(sn+1, r¯n) where r¯n is the opponent of rn.
An infinite play of this game is winning for ∃ if α ∈ L, where α = ⋃n∈ω sn is the unique
ω-word that has all sn as prefixes.
Now we move to the tree variant of this game. A tree-prefix is a partial function
s : {L, R}∗ ⇀ Σ where the domain dom(s) is finite, prefix-closed, and each node of dom(s)
has either zero (a leaf) or two (an internal node) children in dom(s). We say that s′ extends
s if s′ 6= ∅, s ⊆ s′, and each leaf of s is an internal node of s′.
Definition 2.4. Fix a language L ⊆ TΣ of trees over Σ. The Banach–Mazur game on L
(denoted BM(L)) is the following game with configurations of the form (s, r) where s is
a tree-prefix and r ∈ {∃,∀}. The initial configuration (s0, r0) is (∅,∀). Consider a round
n = 0, 1, . . . that starts in a configuration (sn, rn). In this round, the player rn chooses a
tree-prefix sn+1 that extends sn and the round ends in the configuration (sn+1, r¯n) where r¯n
is the opponent of rn. An infinite play of this game is winning for Player ∃ if t ∈ L, where
t =
⋃
n∈ω sn.
Theorem 2.5. A language L of ω-words or trees over Σ with the Baire property is comeager
if and only if ∃ has a winning strategy in the Banach–Mazur game on L.
2.3. Probability Measures. We summarize below the basic concepts related to Borel
measures. For more details see, e.g, [16, Chapter 17].
In what follows, let X be a zero–dimensional Polish space. The smallest σ-algebra of
subsets of X containing all open sets is denoted by B and its elements are called Borel sets.
A Borel probability measure on X is a function µ : B → [0, 1] such that: µ(∅) = 0, µ(X) = 1
and, if {Bn}n∈ω is a sequence of disjoint Borel sets, µ
(⋃
nBn
)
=
∑
n µ(Bn).
A subset A ⊆ X is a µ-null set if A ⊆ B for some Borel set B ⊆ X such that µ(B) = 0.
A subset A ⊆ X is a Fσ set if it can be expressed as a countable union of closed sets.
Every Borel measure µ on a X is regular : for every Borel set B there exists an Fσ set A ⊆ B
such that µ(A) = µ(B).
Lebesgue measure on ω-words. For a fixed finite non-empty set Σ = {a1, . . . , ak}, we
will be exclusively interested in one specific Borel measure µω on the space Σ
ω which we
refer to as Lebesgue measure (on ω-words). This is the unique Borel measure satisfying
the equality µw(Bn=a) =
1
k where Bn=a = {(ai)i∈ω | an = a}, for each n ∈ N and a ∈ Σ.
Intuitively, the Lebesgue measure on ω-words generates an infinite sequence (a0, a1, . . . ) by
labelling the n-th entry with some letter a ∈ Σ chosen randomly and uniformly. This is
done independently for each position n ∈ ω.
Lebesgue measure on trees. Similarly, for a finite non-empty set Σ = {a1, . . . , ak},
the Lebesgue measure on trees TΣ is the unique Borel measure, denoted by µt, satisfying
µt(Bv=a) =
1
k where Bv=a = {t ∈ Σ{L,R}
∗ | t(v) = a}, for v ∈ {L, R}∗ and a ∈ Σ. Once again,
the Lebesgue measure on trees generates an infinite tree over Σ by labelling each vertex v
with a randomly chosen letter a ∈ Σ. This is done independently for each vertex v ∈ {L, R}∗.
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2.4. Large Sections Projections. Let X and Y be Polish spaces. We denote with X ×Y
the product space endowed with the product topology. Given a subset A ⊆ X × Y and an
element x ∈ X we denote with Ax ⊆ Y the section of A at x defined as: Ax def= {y ∈ Y |
(x, y) ∈ A}.
A fundamental operation in descriptive set theory, corresponding to the logical operation
of universal quantification, is that of taking full sections: given A ⊆ X × Y we denote with
∀YA ⊆ X the set
∀YA def= {x ∈ X | Ax = Y }
In other words, ∀YA is the collection of those x ∈ X such that for all y ∈ Y the pair (x, y)
is in A, see Figure 1.
#»
Y
X φ(x, #»y )
∀x. φ(x, #»y )
Figure 1: The universal quantifier ∀. A formula ∀x. φ(x, #»y ) holds for parameters #»y ∈ #»Y
if for every choice of x ∈ X we have φ(x, #»y ). The full sections selected by this
quantifier are marked in gray.
Definition 2.6 (Projective sets). The family of projective sets is the smallest family
containing Borel sets and closed under Boolean operations and full sections.
The content of this article is based on other operations studied in descriptive set theory
(see, e.g., [16, § 29.E]) based on the idea of taking large sections, rather than full sections,
see Figure 2. From a logical point of view, these operations corresponds to some kind of
weakened “for almost all” quantification.
The two notions of “largeness” that are relevant in this work are that of being comeager
and having Lebesgue measure 1, see Figure 2.
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#»
Y
X φ(x, #»y )
Qx. φ(x, #»y )
Figure 2: A large section quantifier Q, for instance Q can be ∀, ∀∗, ∀=1, etc. A formula
Qx. φ(x, #»y ) holds for parameters #»y ∈ #»Y if there are in some sense many (but
possibly not all) values x ∈ X such that φ(x, #»y ) holds. The large sections selected
by this quantifier are marked in gray.
Correspondingly, given A ⊆ X × Y , we denote with ∀∗YA ⊆ X and ∀=1Y A ⊆ X the sets
defined as:
∀∗YA def= {x ∈ X | Ax is comeager}
∀=1Y A def= {x ∈ X | Ax has Lebesgue measure 1}
If the space Y is known from the context, we skip the subscript Y . We refer to the
operations ∀∗ and ∀=1 as the (Baire) Category quantifier and the (Lebesgue) Measure
quantifier, respectively.
Remark 2.7. It is consistent with ZFC that, e.g., there exists a projective set A (even a
Σ12 set) which does not have the Baire property and is not Lebesgue measurable. However,
the sets ∀=1Y A and ∀∗Y are well-defined even if the set A is not Lebesgue measurable or it
does not have the Baire property.
The following classical result states that the above operations preserve the class of Borel
sets.
Theorem 2.8. If A ⊆ X × Y is a Borel set then ∀∗YA and ∀=1Y A are Borel sets.
A proof of the above theorem can be obtained from [16, Theorem 29.22] for ∀∗ and [16,
Theorem 29.26] for ∀=1, which are more generally stated for analytic sets, and an application
of Souslin theorem [16, Theorem 14.11].
2.5. Alternating automata. Given a finite set X, we denote with DL(X) the set of
expressions e generated by the grammar
e ::= x | e ∧ e | e ∨ e for x ∈ X
An alternating tree automaton over a finite alphabet Σ is a tuple A = 〈Σ, Q, qI, δ,F) where Q
is a finite set of states, qI ∈ Q is the initial state, δ : Q×Σ→ DL({L, R}×Q) is the alternating
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transition function, F ⊆ P(Q) is a set of subsets of Q called the Muller condition. The
Muller condition F is called a parity condition if there exists a parity assignment pi : Q→ ω
such that: F = {F ⊆ Q | (maxq∈F pi(q)) is even}.
An alternating automaton A over an alphabet Σ defines, or “accepts”, a set of Σ-trees.
The acceptance of a tree t ∈ TΣ is defined via a two-player (∃ and ∀) game of infinite
duration denoted as A(t). The configurations of the game A(t) are of the form 〈u, q〉 or
〈u, e〉 with u ∈ {L, R}∗, q ∈ Q, and e ∈ DL({L, R} ×Q) (we can implicitly restrict to the set
of sub-formulae of the formulae appearing in the alternating transition function δ).
The game A(t) starts in the configuration 〈, qI〉. Game configurations of the form
〈u, q〉, including the initial state, have only one successor configuration, to which the game
progresses automatically. The successor state is 〈u, e〉 with e = δ(q, a), where a = t(u)
is the labelling of the vertex u given by t. The dynamics of the game at configurations
〈u, e〉 depends on the possible shapes of e. If e = e1 ∨ e2, then Player ∃ moves either to
〈u, e1〉 or 〈u, e2〉. If e = e1 ∧ e2, then Player ∀ moves either to 〈u, e1〉 or 〈u, e2〉. If e = (L, q)
then the game progresses automatically to the state 〈uL, q〉. Lastly, if e = (R, q) the game
progresses automatically to the state 〈uR, q〉. Thus a play in the game A(t) is a sequence Π
of configurations, that can look like
Π = (〈, qI〉, . . . , 〈L, q1〉, . . . , 〈LR, q2〉, . . . , 〈LRL, q3〉, . . . , 〈LRLL, q4〉, . . . ),
where the dots represent part of the play in configurations of the form 〈u, e〉. Let inf(Π) be
the set of automata states q ∈ Q occurring infinitely often in the configurations of the form
〈u, q〉 of Π. We then say that the play Π of A(t) is winning for ∃, if inf(Π) ∈ F . The play
Π is winning for ∀ otherwise. The language of Σ-trees defined by A denoted L(A) is the
collection {t ∈ TΣ | ∃ has a winning strategy in the game A(t)}.
An alternating automaton for ω-words is defined analogously, except that δ : Q× Σ→
DL(Q). In that case the the first coordinate of configurations of the game A(α) is always a
natural number, the game moves from a configuration (n, q) to the configuration (n+ 1, e)
with e = δ(q, a), where a = α(n) is the labelling of the position n given by α. In that case
L(A) ⊆ Σω.
Types of automata. An alternating automaton A is non-deterministic if all the transitions
of A are of the form(
(L, q1,L)∧(R, q1,R)
) ∨ ((L, q2,L)∧(R, q2,R)) ∨ . . . ∨ ((L, qk,L)∧(R, qk,R)).
An alternating automaton A is a game automaton if all the transitions of A are of the form
(L, qL) χ (R, qR) with χ = ∨ or ∧. An alternating automaton A is deterministic if it is a game
automaton with χ = ∧ in all transitions.
3. Syntax and Semantics of Monadic Second Order Logic
In this section we define the syntax and the semantics of the Monadic Second-order logic
interpreted over the linear order of natural numbers (denoted S1S) and over the full binary
tree (denoted S2S). This material is entirely standard. A detailed exposition can be found
in [26].
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3.1. Logic S1S and ω-words. The syntax of S1S formulas is given by the grammar
φ ::= x < y | x ∈ X | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | ∀x. φ | ∀X.φ
where x, y and X,Y range over countable sets of first-order variables and second-order
variables, respectively.
The semantics of S1S formulas on the structure (ω,<) is defined as expected by
interpreting the formula ∀X.φ as quantifying over all subsets X ⊆ ω and the relation (∈) as
the membership relation between elements x ∈ ω and sets X ⊆ ω.
For example the formula
∃X.∀x. ((x ∈ X)⇒ (∃y. y ∈ X ∧ x < y))
expresses the existence of an unbounded set X of natural numbers.
We write φ(~x, ~X) to specify that the first-order and second-order variables of φ are ~x
and ~X, respectively.
We can always assume that the free variables of a formula φ are all second-order
variables, i.e., φ = φ(∅, ~X). Indeed if φ({x1, . . . , xn}, ~Y ) is not of this form, we can consider
the semantically equivalent formula ψ(∅, {X1, . . . , Xn}∪ ~Y ), having second-order ~X variables
(constrained to be singletons) simulating first-order ones.
Each set X ⊆ ω can be identified as the corresponding ω-word over the alphabet
Σ = {0, 1}. Hence a S1S formula φ(X1, . . . , Xn) defines a collection of n-tuples of ω-words
over Σ = {0, 1} or, equivalently, a collection of ω-words over the alphabet Γ = {0, 1}n. The
language defined by φ, denoted by L(φ) ⊆ Γω is the set of ω-words over Γ satisfying φ.
The following theorem and proposition are well known.
Theorem 3.1. The theory of S1S is decidable. The expressive power of S1S is effectively
equivalent with alternating / non-deterministic / deterministic Muller automata.
Proposition 3.2. For every S1S formula φ, the language L(φ) is a Borel subset of Γω.
Hence for every S1S formula φ, the language L(φ) has the Baire property and is Lebesgue
measurable.
3.2. Logic S2S and infinite trees. We now introduce, following a similar presentation,
the syntax and the semantics of the MSO logic on the full binary tree (S2S).
The full binary tree is the structure ({L, R}∗, succL, succR) where succL and succR are
binary relations on {L, R}∗ relating a vertex with its left and right child, respectively:
succL = {(w,wL) | w ∈ {L, R}∗} succR = {(w,wR) | w ∈ {L, R}∗}
The syntax of S2S formulas is given by the grammar
φ ::= succL(x, y) | succR(x, y) | x ∈ X | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | ∀x. φ | ∀X.φ
where x, y and X,Y range over countable sets of first-order variables and second-order
variables, respectively.
The semantics of S2S formulae on the full binary tree is defined by interpreting the
formula ∀X.φ as quantifying over all subsets X ⊆ {L, R}∗ and x ∈ X as the membership
relations between vertices x ∈ {L, R}∗ and sets X ⊆ {L, R}∗.
For example the formula
∃X.∀x. ((x ∈ X)⇒ (∃y. y ∈ X ∧ succL(x, y)))
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expresses the existence of a set of vertices which is closed under taking left children.
As for S1S, we can assume without loss of generality that the free variables of a S2S
formula φ are all second-order.
Each set X ⊆ {L, R}∗ can be identified as a tree t ∈ TΣ over the alphabet Σ = {0, 1}.
Hence a S2S formula φ(X1, . . . , Xn) defines a collection of n-tuples of trees in T{0,1} or,
equivalently, a collection of trees in TΓ over the alphabet Γ = {0, 1}n. The set of t ∈ TΓ
satisfying the formula φ is called the language defined by φ and is denoted by L(φ).
The following theorem and proposition are well known.
Theorem 3.3. The theory of S2S is decidable. The expressive power of MSO over infinite
trees is effectively equivalent with alternating / non-deterministic Muller automata. The
expressive power of deterministic automata is strictly weaker.
Proposition 3.4. For every S2S formula φ, the language L(φ) is a ∆12 subset of TΓ.
It has recently been shown that L(φ) is always Lebesgue measurable and has the Baire
property [12].
Proposition 3.5. For every S2S formula φ the language L(φ) has the Baire property and
is Lebesgue measurable.
4. S1S extended with the category quantifier
In this section we define the syntax and semantics of the logic S1S extended with the category
quantifier (∀∗). The syntax of S1S + ∀∗ extends that of S1S with the new second-order
quantifier ∀∗ as follows:
φ ::= x < y | x ∈ X | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | ∀x. φ | ∀X.φ | ∀∗X.φ
The semantics of the category quantifier is specified as follows.
L
(∀∗X.φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn)) = {w ∈ Γω | {w′ ∈ {0, 1}ω | φ(w′, w)} is comeager}
where Γ = {0, 1}n.
In other words, an n-tuple w = (w1, . . . , wn), with wi ∈ {0, 1}ω, satisfies the formula
∀∗X.φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn) if for a large (comeager) collection of w′ ∈ {0, 1}ω, the extended tuple
(w′, w) satisfies φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn). Informally, w satisfies ∀∗X.φ(X, #»Y ) if “for almost all”
w′ ∈ {0, 1}ω, the tuple (w′, w) satisfies φ. The set defined by ∀∗X.φ(X, #»Y ) can be illustrated
as in Figure 2, as the collection of tuples w having a large (comeager) section φ(X,w).
The main result about S1S + ∀∗ is the following quantifier elimination theorem which
appears to be folklore. We provide a complete proof of this theorem for two reasons: first,
instead of just simulating the Banach–Mazur game over ω-words, we want to inductively
remove all the meager quantifiers from the formula; second, the proof presented here is a
good base for understanding the more difficult proof from Section 6.
Theorem 4.1. For every S1S + ∀∗ formula φ one can effectively construct a semantically
equivalent S1S formula ψ.
Corollary 4.2. The theory of S1S + ∀∗ is decidable.
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The rest of this section is devoted to an inductive proof of Theorem 4.1. For that sake it
is enough to show how to eliminate one application of the quantifier ∀∗. Consider a formula
of S1S + ∀∗ of the form ∀∗X.ψ, where ψ is a formula of S1S. We will prove that there
exists a formula ψ′ of S1S that is equivalent to ∀∗X.ψ. We start by translating ψ into
an equivalent deterministic Muller automaton A. Then we apply the following technical
proposition that provides us an alternating Muller automaton B, recognising ω-words that
satisfy ∀∗X.ψ. Finally, we can turn B into a non-deterministic Muller automaton and
express L(B) by an S1S formula ψ′.
Proposition 4.3. Let A be a deterministic Muller automaton over ω-words, with the
alphabet Σ× Γ. Consider the language ∀∗L(A) that contains an ω-word α ∈ Σω if and only
if the set {
β ∈ Γω | (α, β) ∈ L(A)} (4.1)
is comeager.
Then, ∀∗L(A) is ω-regular and one can effectively construct an alternating Muller
automaton B for this language. Additionally, the size of the automaton B is polynomial in
the size of A.
Fix a deterministic automaton A over a product alphabet Σ× Γ. Let Q be the set of
states of A and δA : Q×Σ×Γ→ Q be the transition function: for a triple (q, a, b) ∈ Q×Σ×Γ
it assigns the successive state δA(q, a, b) ∈ Q that should be reached after reading a letter
(a, b) from the state q.
We will construct an alternating automaton B over the alphabet Σ. Intuitively, B will
simulate the Banach–Mazur game over ∀∗L(A) in which a new ω-word β ∈ Γω is constructed.
During that play, the automaton A will be run over the pair of ω-words (α, β) ∈ (Σ× Γ)ω
to verify if this pair belongs to L(A). To achieve this, the set of states of B will keep track
of both, the current state of A and the player in charge of construction of β. More formally,
let the set of states of B be Q× {∃,∀}.
The initial state of B is (qI,∀). Consider a state (q, r) of B and a letter a ∈ Σ. The
transition δB(q, r, a) is supposed to allow the player r to choose a letter b ∈ Γ and the next
player r′ ∈ {∃,∀}. After that choices are done, the successive state of the automaton should
be (q, r′) where q = δA(q, a, b). The structure of the automaton B is depicted in Figure 3.
More formally, we achieve that by putting:
δB(q, r, a) def=χ
b∈Γ
χ
r′∈{∃,∀}
(q, r′), (4.2)
where χ is ∨ if r = ∃ and ∧ otherwise, and δA(q, a, b) = q.
The acceptance condition of the automaton B will be the following Muller condition: a
set of states F ⊆ Q× {∃,∀} belongs to FB if either:
(1) all the states (q, r) ∈ F satisfy r = ∀ (i.e. from some point on ∀ has always chosen
r′ = r = ∀,
(2) or F contains both states of the form (q,∃) and (q′,∀); and additionally the set of states
{q ∈ Q | (q, r) ∈ F for some r ∈ {∃,∀}} is accepting for A (i.e. belongs to FA).
In other words, if any of the players from some point on chooses r′ = r then he or she looses.
Otherwise, the game is won by ∃ if the sequence of states visited is accepting in A.
The following lemma proves correctness of our construction and thus concludes the
proof of Theorem 6.1.
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(q1,∃) (q1,∃)
(q2,∃) (q2,∃)
(q3,∃) (q3,∃)
...
...
a
a′
b
b′
...
(q1,∀) (q1,∀)
(q2,∀) (q2,∀)
(q3,∀) (q3,∀)
...
...
a
a′
b
b′...
...
...
∃
∀
∃
∀
δA(q2, a′, b′) = q2
δA(q1, a, b) = q3
δA(q2, a′, b′) = q2
δA(q1, a, b) = q3
Q× {∃}
Q× {∀}
transition starts in (q, r)
letter a ∈ Σ is given
Player r chooses b ∈ Γ
Player r chooses r′ ∈ {∃,∀}
transition ends in
(
δA(q, a, b), r′
)
Figure 3: The structure of the automaton B. The transitions are depicted with the convention
that choices of ∃ (i.e., ∨) are represented by diamonds; and the choices of ∀ (i.e.,
∧) are represented by squares. The states of the automaton are drawn twice, on
the left and right edge of the picture for the sake of readability, the double arrows
show that we actually go back to the left copy. The phases of each transition
(i.e. rounds of the acceptance game) are explained by the braces below the picture.
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Lemma 4.4. The automaton B accepts an ω-word α ∈ Σω if and only if the language
from (4.1) is comeager.
Informally, the core of the above lemma is the observation that for a fixed α ∈ Σω there
is a bijection between:
• the plays of the Banach–Mazur game over the language (4.1) (denoted BM);
• the plays of the acceptance game of B over α, in which infinitely many times r′ 6= r.
To make this relationship more formal, we will show how to simulate plays of BM using
the acceptance game B(α). Consider an ω-word α ∈ Σω and assume that P ∈ {∃,∀} wins
the acceptance game of B over α (i.e. α ∈ L(B) iff P = ∃). We will prove that P wins BM.
Fix a strategy σP of P in the acceptance game B(α). We will inductively describe how
P can simulate this strategy in the game BM. Assume that we are at the beginning of the
nth round of BM and the current configuration of this game is (sn, rn).
Claim 4.5. During the simulated play of BM the following invariant will be preserved:
there exists a finite play of B(α), that is consistent with σP and in this play, after reading
the first |sn| symbols of α the reached configuration has the form 〈|sn|, (qn, rn)〉 for some
qn ∈ Q (and rn as above).
We will now show how to play one round of BM while still preserving the invariant
from Claim 4.5. Consider the following two possibilities for rn ∈ {∃,∀}.
The case rn 6= P . In that case it is the opponent of P (denoted P¯ ) that chooses the
successive word sn+1 in BM. Assume that P¯ has played sn+1 = snw for some non-empty
word w = b0b1 . . . bk. Consider the k+1 rounds of B(α) starting from 〈|sn|, (qn, rn)〉 in
which P¯ plays the successive letters b0, b1, . . . , bk. In the rounds 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 he chooses
r′ = r = P¯ and in the last round he chooses r′ 6= r such that r′ = P . After that k+1 rounds
the simulated play of B(α) has reached a configuration of the form 〈|sn+1|, (qn+1, rn+1)〉
with rn+1 = P , and the invariant is satisfied.
The case rn = P . Now consider the more involved case where this is Player P who chooses
a word sn+1. Consider the successive rounds of the game B(α) after the round that ended in
〈|sn|, (qn, rn)〉. Since rn = P we know that it will be Player P who will propose successive
letters b0, b1, . . . and players r
′ in each round. Let b0, b1, . . . be the finite or infinite sequence
of letters played by P according to σP until P chooses to set r
′ 6= r = P for the first time.
Since σP is winning, we know that P cannot keep r
′ = r = P forever, otherwise P would
lose the infinite play. Thus, the sequence b0, b1, . . . , bk is finite and after playing bk Player P
has chosen r′ 6= r = P . Let sn+1 = snb0b1 · · · bk be the response of P in the game BM.
After that, the configuration of BM is (sn+1, P¯ ) and the configuration of B(α) is of the
form 〈|sn+1|, (qn+1, rn+1)〉 with rn+1 = P¯ , so the invariant is satisfied.
This finishes the proof of Claim 4.5. What remains is to prove that the described
simulation strategy is winning for P in BM.
Why P wins. We need to prove that the produced word β =
⋃
n∈ω sn satisfies (α, β) ∈ L(A)
if and only if P = ∃. But we know that the strategy σP is winning for P , therefore the
simulated play of B(α) must be winning for P . Since we have guaranteed that infinitely
many times r′ 6= r, it means that the sequence of visited states of A is accepting iff P = ∃.
Thus, (α, β) ∈ L(A) iff P = ∃, what means that P has won the considered play of BM.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.4 as well as Theorem 4.1.
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5. S1S extended with the measure quantifier
In this section we define the syntax and semantics of the logic S1S extended with the
measure quantifier (∀=1). The syntax of S1S + ∀=1 extends that of S1S with the new
second-order quantifier ∀=1 as follows:
φ ::= x < y | x ∈ X | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | ∀x. φ | ∀X.φ | ∀=1X.φ
The semantics of the measure is specified as follows.
L
(
∀=1X.φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn)
)
=
{
w ∈ Γω | µw
({w′ ∈ {0, 1}ω | φ(w′, w) holds}) = 1}
where Γ = {0, 1}n and µω is the Lebesgue measure on {0, 1}ω.
In other words, a n-tuple w = (w1, . . . , wn), with wi ∈ {0, 1}ω, satisfies the formula
∀∗X.φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn) if for a large (having measure 1) collection of w′ ∈ {0, 1}ω, the extended
tuple (w′, w) satisfies φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn).
Once again, informally, w satisfies ∀=1X.φ(X, #»Y ) if “for almost all” w′ ∈ {0, 1}ω, the
tuple (w′, w) satisfies φ. In the logic S1S+∀=1 the “almost all” means for all but a negligible
(having measure 0) set.
The main result of this section is that, unlike the case of S1S + ∀∗, the theory of
S1S+∀=1 is undecidable (Theorem 5.2 below). This result was first proved in [20] by means
of a reduction to the emptiness problem of probabilistic Bu¨chi automata which is known to
be undecidable from [1].
Here we propose a different proof based on the recent result of [7] stating the logic
S1S + U, introduced by Bojan´czyk in [3], has an undecidable theory. We recall that the
syntax of S1S + U extends that of S1S with the new second-order unbounding quantifier
(UX.φ) whose semantics is specified as follows:
L
(
UX.φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn)
)
=
{
w ∈ Γω | ∀n.∃w′ ∈ {0, 1}ω.(n < |w′| <∞∧ φ(w′, w) holds)}
where Γ = {0, 1}n and n < |w′| <∞ means that w′, seen as a subset of N, is finite and has
at least n elements.
Theorem 5.1. For every formula ϕ of S1S + U there effectively exists a formula ϕ′ of
S1S + ∀=1 such that L(ϕ) = L(ϕ′).
The above reduction, together with [7, 15], give us the following corollary.
Corollary 5.2. The logic S1S + ∀=1 has an undecidable theory. Furthermore, for each
positive number k ∈ ω there exists a S1S + ∀=1 formula φ(X) such that L(φ) ⊆ {0, 1}ω does
not belong to the ∆1k class of the projective hierarchy.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 5.1. We will assume that using
S1S logic we can freely quantify over ω-words over fixed alphabets — this can be simulated
by quantifying over tuples of sets representing positions that bear a given letter.
The first step of our proof is standard: we prove that instead of using the U quantifier
in S1S + U, one can use a specific predicate.
Definition 5.3. Let α ∈ {0, 1, R}ω be an infinite word. We say that α is unbounded
(denoted U(α)) if α contains infinitely many letters R and, for every n there exists a pair of
consecutive letters R such that in-between them there are at least n letters 1.
Before moving forward, we will introduce a couple of useful concepts.
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Definition 5.4. Fix α ∈ {0, 1, R}ω and assume that α contains infinitely many letters R.
(1) A set B of consecutive positions {i, i+ 1, . . . , j} of α is called a block if: α contains no
R at positions {i, . . . , j − 1}; i = 0 or α(i − 1) = R; and α(j) = R. In other words, a
block is a maximal set of successive positions of α such that the only R that appears
among them is the last position in the block.
(2) Since blocks are disjoint, we can identify an arbitrary set of blocks with its union S — a
subset of ω.
(3) If B is a block, by the value of B we denote the number v of positions of α in B that
are labeled by 1. v is always a non-negative integer.
Lemma 5.5. The logic S1S+U is effectively expressively equivalent to the logic S1S equipped
with the U predicate defined above.
The above lemma is a standard technical adjustment of the U quantifier, see for instance
the notion of sequential witness from Lemma 5.5 of [5]. For the sake of completeness, we
sketch a proof of it.
Proof. Clearly the U predicate can easily be expressed by the U quantifier. Now consider an
application of a U quantifier of the form UX.φ(X). We claim that the following formula is
equivalent to UX.φ(X)
ψ
def
= ∃α.U(α) ∧ ∀B. (B is a block of α)⇒[
∃X.X is finite, φ(X), and ∀x ∈ B.α(x) = 1⇒ x ∈ X
]
.
Clearly, if ψ holds then UX.φ(X) holds as well (the positions labeled 1 in the blocks of α
witness that). The other direction is also easy, it is enough to construct a witness α. We
proceed inductively, at nth step taking a finite set X of cardinality large enough to guarantee
that it has at least n elements greater in the order ≤ from all the previously considered
positions. These n new positions will be labeled 1 in the nth block of α.
In the presence of the above lemma, Theorem 5.1 follows directly from the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.6. There exists a formula ψU of S1S + ∀=1 over the alphabet {0, 1, R} such that
α ∈ {0, 1, R}ω satisfies ψ if and only if U(α) holds.
Proof. Consider the following formula ψU :
ψU (α)
def
= ∃S. S is an infinite set of blocks in α ∧
¬[∀=1X.∃B.B ⊆ S and B is a block in α ∧
∀x. if x ∈ B and α(x) = 1 then x ∈ X].
Claim 5.7. The formula ψU (α) holds if and only if U(α) holds.
Without loss of generality we can restrict to ω-words α containing infinitely many letters
R (otherwise both properties are false).
To simplify our notation, let us denote by ϕ(X,B) the property that: for every x ∈ B
such that α(x) = 1 we have x ∈ X. Consider a fixed block B of α that has value v and let
X ⊆ ω be a randomly chosen set. Then, the probability that ϕ(X,B) holds is equal to 2−v.
Now, if S is an infinite set of blocks of α with values v0, v1, . . ., the probability that for a
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X
α 0 0 1 R 0 0 0 0 R 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 R 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 · · ·
· · ·
B0 B1 B2
Figure 4: A word α divided into blocks B0, B1, . . . The values of the blocks are v0 = 1,
v1 = 0, v2 = 4, . . . The formula ϕ(X,B) holds for B0 and B1 but not for B2.
random set X ⊆ ω some block of S satisfies ϕ(X,B) is equal to
1−
∏
n∈ω
(
1− 2−vn) (5.1)
For an illustration of an ω-word α and its division into blocks, see Figure 4.
We are now in position to prove Claim 5.7. First consider α such that it is not the
case that U(α) holds. Therefore, there is a global bound M such that if B is a block in
α then the value of B is at most M . Let S be any infinite set of blocks in α as in the
formula ψU . By (5.1), the probability that some block B of S satisfies ϕ(X,B) equals
1−∏n∈ω (1− 2−vn) ≥ 1−∏n∈ω (1− 2−M) = 1− 0 = 1. Therefore, ψU (α) is false.
Now consider the opposite case that U(α) holds. We will prove that ψU (α) holds. By
the assumption, for every M there exists a block B in α of value greater than M . Let
0 < c0 < c1 < . . . < 1 be a sequence of numbers such that
∏
n∈ω cn > 0. For each n, there
exists a block Bn of α of value vn such that 1− 2−vn > cn. Let S be the union of the blocks
Bn, clearly S is infinite. Take a random set X ⊆ ω. By (5.1), the probability that some
block B of S satisfies ϕ(X,B) equals 1−∏n∈ω (1− 2−vn) ≤ 1−∏n∈ω cn < 1. Therefore,
ψU (α) holds.
This concludes the proof of Claim 5.7 and also the proof of Theorem 5.1.
6. S2S extended with the category quantifier
In this section we consider the extension of the monadic second order logic of the full binary
tree (S2S) with the category quantifier.
The syntax of S2S + ∀∗ extends that of S2S with the new second-order quantifier ∀∗ as
follows:
φ ::= succL(x, y) | succR(x, y) | x ∈ X | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | ∀x. φ | ∀X.φ | ∀∗X.φ
The semantics of the category quantifier is specified as follows.
L
(
∀∗X.φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn)
)
=
{
t ∈ TΓ | the set {t′ ∈ T{0,1} | φ(t′, t) holds}
)
is comeager
}
where Γ = {0, 1}n.
Our main theorem is the following result, showing that the category quantifier preserves
S2S-definability when the inner formula can be recognised by a game automaton.
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Theorem 6.1. Let A be a game automaton over an alphabet Σ× Γ. Consider the language
∀∗L(A) that contains a tree t ∈ TΣ if and only if the set{
t′ ∈ TΓ | (t, t′) ∈ L(A)} (6.1)
is comeager.
Then, ∀∗L(A) is regular and one can effectively construct an alternating Muller tree
automaton B for this language. Additionally, the size of the automaton B is polynomial in
the size of A.
It is quite clear that if L is a regular language of trees, then the Banach–Mazur game
BM(L) (see Definition 2.4) cannot be directly encoded in the S2S logic because a strategy
of a player in this game is a complex object (at least it assigns prefixes to prefixes).
Fix a game automaton A over a product alphabet Σ×Γ. Let Q be the set of states of A
and δA : Q×Σ×Γ→ DL({L, R}×Q) be the transition function: for a triple (q, a, b) ∈ Q×Σ×Γ
it assigns an expression of the form (L, qL) χ (R, qR) with χ either ∨ (a transition of ∃) or ∧
(a transition of ∀).
We will construct an alternating automaton B over the alphabet Σ that will read a tree
t ∈ TΣ and verify that the language (6.1) is comeager. The construction follows the same
lines as the proof of Proposition 4.3. The additional difficulty here is that we deal with a
model of automata that is a bit stronger than deterministic ones. Therefore, we need to
take some additional care to resolve the game arising from the semantics of these automata.
Intuitively, B will simulate synchronously two games: the Banach–Mazur game over
∀∗L(A) in which a new tree t′ ∈ TΓ is constructed; and the acceptance game of A over the
constructed pair of trees (t, t′). This parallel execution of the two games will be visible in
the transitions of B. Let the set of states of B keep track of both, the current state of A and
the player in charge of construction of the tree, i.e., the set of states of B is Q× {∃,∀}.
The initial state of B is (qI,∀). Consider a state (q, r) of B and a letter a ∈ Σ. The
transition δB(q, r, a) is supposed to give the following choices to the players:
• Player r chooses a letter b ∈ Γ,
• Player r chooses the next player, r′ ∈ {∃,∀},
• the owner of the transition δA(q, a, b) = (L, qL) ψ (R, qR) in A resolves this formula by
choosing a direction d ∈ {L, R}.
After that choices are done, the transition that is taken should be 〈d, (qd, r′)〉, i.e. we should
move in the direction d to the new state (qd, r
′). More formally, we achieve that by putting:
δB〈(q, r), a〉 def=χ
b∈Γ
χ
r′∈{∃,∀}
Ψ
d∈{L,R}
〈d, (qd, r′)〉, (6.2)
where χ is ∨ if r = ∃ and ∧ otherwise, and δA〈q, (a, b)〉 = (L, qL)ψ (R, qR) (i.e. the last boolean
operator in δB〈(q, r), a〉 is the same as the one in δA〈q, (a, b)〉).
The acceptance condition of the automaton B will be the same as in Section 4: a set of
states F ⊆ Q× {∃,∀} belongs to FB if either:
(1) all the states (q, r) ∈ F satisfy r = ∀ (i.e. from some point on ∀ has always chosen
r′ = r = ∀,
(2) or F contains both states of the form (q,∃) and (q′,∀); and additionally the set of states
{q ∈ Q | (q, r) ∈ F for some r ∈ {∃,∀}} is accepting for A (i.e. belongs to FA).
In other words, if any of the players from some point on chooses r′ = r then he or she looses.
Otherwise, the game is won by ∃ if the sequence of states visited is accepting in A.
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The following lemma proves correctness of our construction and thus concludes the
proof of Theorem 6.1. Notice that, except the choice of directions d, the construction is
almost identical to the one presented in Section 4.
Lemma 6.2. The automaton B accepts a tree t ∈ TΣ if and only if the language from (6.1)
is comeager.
Before giving a formal (but technical) proof of this lemma, we will provide an overview.
Assume that a player P has a winning strategy σP in the acceptance game B(t) of B over
a tree t ∈ TΣ. By the definition we know that t ∈ L(B) iff P = ∃. Our aim is to simulate
the strategy σP as a strategy of P in the Banach–Mazur game over the language (6.1) (we
denote this game BM for the rest of the proof). This will imply that: t ∈ L(B) iff P = ∃ iff
∃ wins BM iff the language (6.1) is comeager.
Since the domain of all our trees is the same — {L, R}∗, we can imagine that during a
play of BM, the players write the respective prefixes s : {L, R}∗ ⇀ Γ on top of the given tree
t ∈ TΣ. More formally, for s : {L, R}∗ ⇀ Γ let us define a prefix t ⊗ s : {L, R}∗ ⇀ Σ × Γ as
follows: let dom(t⊗ s) def= dom(s) and for u ∈ dom(s) let (s⊗ t)(u) def= (t(u), s(u)).
We will use the strategy σP to help the player P win BM by the following two
requirements:
(1) Player P will provide the letters of sn and the moments to finish the current prefix
according to his choices in the transitions of B,
(2) Player P will separately store some information about his choices regarding directions
in a data structure called τ .
Then, we will prove that a play of BM is won by Player P by noticing that the finally
obtained data structure τ is a winning strategy of P in the acceptance game A(t, t′) of the
game automaton A over the product tree (t, t′) with t′ = ⋃n∈ω sn.
The following claim describes the invariants of our construction, see Figure 5 for an
illustration.
Claim 6.3. Assume that the current configuration of BM is (sn, rn). In that case, there
must exist: a set τn ⊆ {L, R}∗ of nodes and an assignment pin that for every node u ∈ τn gives
a finite play pin(u) of the acceptance game of A over t⊗ sn. The set τn and the assignment
pin need to extend the previous ones τn−1 and pin−1 and additionally the following invariants
are required:
(1)  ∈ τn; τn is prefix-closed; and pin() consists of the initial configuration 〈, (qI,∀)〉 of
A(t⊗ sn).
(2) If u ∈ τn and u /∈ sn then no sequence extending u belongs to τn (we call such u an
end-point of τn).
(3) If ud ∈ τn for some u, d, then the play pin(ud) extends the play pin(u) by a round played
according to σP in which the chosen letter b is sn(u); the chosen player r
′ equals the
previous player r iff ud is not an end-point for one of τ0, τ1, . . . , τn; and the chosen
direction is d.
(4) Take u ∈ τn. Then the play pin(u) needs to end in a configuration 〈u, (q, r)〉.
(5) Take u ∈ τn that is not an end-point of τn and assume that the play pin(u) ends in a
configuration of the form 〈u, (q, r)〉. If δA(q, t(u), sn(u)) is a transition of Player P¯ then
both uL and uR belong to τn; otherwise exactly one of uL, uR belongs to τn (the choice of
d will depend on the strategy σP of P ).
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s1
s2
configurations of the form (q,∀)
configurations of the form (q,∃)
t
Figure 5: An illustration of our simulation procedure. We are right after the second round
of BM. The currently played prefixes are s0 = ∅, s1 and s2. The boldfaced
subtree of t is our data structure τ2 (it contains τ1). The nodes in circles are the
end-points of τ1 and τ2. While we are still in s1, all the configurations visited
in the simulated plays of A(t, t′) are of the form 〈u, (q,∀)〉. Then, within s2 we
ensure that the configurations have the form 〈u, (q,∃)〉 etc. The branching in τ1
and τ2 occurs exactly in those places where the respective transition of the game
automaton A is controlled by the opponent of our Player P . When the respective
transition belongs to P , the choice of direction is resolved immediately. In that
case we do not care about the content of the played prefixes in the skipped subtree
(outside the respective τn).
Notice that Invariants (3) and (4) guarantee that the last configuration of the play pin(u)
for u an end-point of τn is of the form 〈u, (q, rn)〉 — the position in the tree is u and the
players switch exactly when moving to an end-point of one of τ0, . . . , τn.
Initially, for n = 0, we have s0 = ∅ and all the invariants are satisfied by τ0 = {} and
pi0 that maps  to the initial configuration of the acceptance game of A (i.e. 〈, (qI,∀)〉).
We will now describe how to inductively preserve the invariants from Claim 6.3. Consider
an nth round of the game BM. Its initial configuration is (sn, rn) with a set τn and assignment
pin. There are two cases depending whether rn = P or not.
Simulation: the case of rn = P¯ . First assume that rn 6= P , i.e. the considered round of
BM is controlled by our opponent. Assume that in this round the player rn plays a prefix
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sn+1 that extends sn. Thus, the round ends in the configuration (sn+1, P ). We construct
τn+1 and pin+1 as follows: start from τn+1 := τn, pin+1 := pin and inductively extend τn+1 and
pin+1 for every end-point u of τn+1 that belongs to sn+1. Consider a round of the acceptance
game of A over t⊗ sn+1 right after the last configuration of pin+1(u). We know that this
configuration is of the form 〈u, (q, P¯ )〉.
Assume that in this round P¯ chooses as the letter b = sn+1(u) and as the successive
player r′ = P¯ if u is not a leaf of sn+1 and r′ = P otherwise. Now consider the following
cases for the rest of this round:
• If the transition δA(q, t(u), sn+1(u)) belongs to P¯ then for both d ∈ {L, R} we add ud ∈ τn+1
and define pin+1(ud), assuming that P¯ played d = L and d = R respectively.
• Otherwise, the strategy σP chooses some direction d ∈ {L, R}. We then add ud ∈ τn+1 and
define pin+1(ud), assuming that P played d. In that case ud¯ /∈ τn+1.
Clearly by the definition all the invariants are satisfied in this case.
Simulation: the case of rn = P . Now take the more involved case when rn = P , i.e. the
considered round of BM is controlled by Player P which strategy σP we simulate. We
will define sn+1, τn+1, and pin+1 inductively, starting from the end-points of τn. For nodes
outside the constructed set τn+1 the letters of sn+1 are arbitrary, i.e. we can assume that for
every ud such that u ∈ τn+1 or u ∈ sn but ud /∈ τn+1 we let sn+1(ud) = b0 for some fixed
letter b0 ∈ Γ. In that case ud will be a leaf of sn+1.
We start from τn+1 := τn, pin+1 := pin. Let u be an end-point of τn+1 such that the
last configuration of the play pin+1(u) is of the form 〈u, (q, r)〉. If r 6= P then we finish this
branch of construction, letting u /∈ sn+1 be an end-point of τn+1. If r = P it means that u
will not be an end-point of τn+1. Consider the successive round after the play pin+1(u) in
which P plays according to σP . First, P chooses a letter b ∈ Γ and a player r′ ∈ {∃,∀}. We
can immediately define sn+1(u) = b. Now consider the following cases for the rest of this
round:
• If the transition δA(q, t(u), b) belongs to P¯ then for both d ∈ {L, R} we add ud ∈ τn+1 and
define pin+1(ud), assuming that P¯ played d = L and d = R respectively.
• Otherwise, the strategy σP chooses some direction d ∈ {L, R}. We then add ud ∈ τn+1 and
define pin+1(ud), assuming that P played d. In that case ud¯ /∈ τn+1.
If the above inductive procedure ends after finitely many steps, we obtain a finite
prefix sn+1 together with τn+1 and pin+1. Notice that for every end-point u of τn+1 the last
configuration of the play pin+1(u) is of the form 〈u, (q, P¯ )〉. Thus, the invariant is satisfied.
Consider the opposite case that the procedure runs indefinitely. In that case, by Ko¨nig’s
Lemma, there is an infinite path in the constructed set τn+1. This path corresponds to
an infinite play of the acceptance game of B over t in which Player P keeps r′ = r = P
constantly equal P from some point on. This contradicts the assumption that P plays
according to a winning strategy σP , as such a play is losing for Player P .
This way we have managed to play a consecutive round of BM while preserving the
invariants. Therefore, by induction on n we can construct a strategy of Player P in BM.
Why P wins? What remains to prove is that any play of BM in which P plays according to
this simulation strategy is winning. Take such a play and consider t′ =
⋃
n∈ω sn, E =
⋃
n∈ω τn,
Π =
⋃
n∈ω pin. It remains to prove that (t, t
′) ∈ L(A) if and only if P = ∃. We achieve that
by proving that E encodes a winning strategy of P in the acceptance game of A over (t, t′).
Clearly, by the structure of all the sets τn, their union E encodes the following strategy of
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P : stay in the nodes of (t, t′) that belong to E. Take any infinite branch β contained in E.
Notice that there is a unique play pi of the acceptance game of B over t that is the limit of
the plays Π(u) for u ≺ β. Thus, since we considered plays according to a winning strategy
σP of P , this play pi must be winning for P . Clearly, the sequence of players r in this play
does not have a limit. Thus, the sequence of visited states q must be either accepting if
P = ∃ or rejecting otherwise. This concludes the proof that the strategy represented by E
is winning for P . Therefore, (t, t′) ∈ L(A) iff P = ∃ and thus P wins BM.
7. S2S extended with the measure quantifier
In this section we consider the extension of the monadic second order logic of the full binary
tree (S2S) with the measure quantifier.
The definitions of the syntax and semantics of S2S + ∀=1 are similar to those given
for S1S + ∀=1. The syntax of S2S + ∀=1 extends that of S2S with the new second-order
quantifier ∀=1 as follows:
φ ::= succL(x, y) | succR(x, y) | x ∈ X | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | ∀x. φ | ∀X.φ | ∀=1X.φ
The semantics of the measure quantifier is specified as follows.
L
(
∀=1X.φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn)
)
=
{
t ∈ TΓ | µt
({t′ ∈ T{0,1} | φ(t′, t) holds}) = 1}
where Γ = {0, 1}n and µt is the Lebesgue measure on T{0,1}.
Once again, informally, t satisfies ∀=1X.φ(X, #»Y ) if “for almost all” t′, the tuple (t′, t)
satisfies φ, where “almost all” means for all but a negligible (having measure 0) set.
Our main result regarding the logic S2S + ∀=1 is the following.
Theorem 7.1. The logic S2S + ∀=1 has an undecidable theory.
This is obtained as a direct corollary of Theorem 5.1 by interpreting the logic S1S+∀=1
within S1S + ∀=1.
Recall that a standard interpretation of S1S within S2S is based on the identification
of (N, <) with the set of vertices {L}∗ (belonging to the leftmost branch of the full binary
tree) ordered by the prefix relation, which are both easily definable in S2S. For example,
the S1S formula ∀X.φ(X) is translated to the S2S formula
∀X.
(
φ(X ∩ {L}∗))
where φ(Y ) is the translation of the simpler formula φ(Y ).
Similarly, we define the translation of S1S + ∀=1 formulas of the form ∀=1X.φ as:
∀=1X.
(
φ(X ∩ {L}∗))
To check that this translation is correct it is sufficient to prove that the function pi
pi(X) = X ∩ {L}∗
mapping subsets of the full binary tree to subsets of the leftmost branch (which can be
identified as ω-words over the alphabet {0, 1}) is Lebesgue measure preserving. That is, we
need to show that pi is a continuous surjection, and this is obvious, and that for every Borel
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set A ⊆ {0, 1}ω it holds that µt(pi−1(A)) = µw(A). By regularity of the Lebesgue measure it
is sufficient to prove that this property holds for arbitrary basic clopen sets A. These are
sets of the form A = U
~n=~b
, for tuples ~n = (n1, . . . , nk) ∈ Nk and (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ {0, 1}k where:
U
~n=~b
=
{
w ∈ {0, 1}ω |
k∧
i=1
w(ni) = bi
}
By definition we have that µw(U~n=~b) =
1
2
k
.
The preimage pi−1(A) is the clopen set B = {t ∈ T{0,1} |
∧k
i=1 t(L
n
i ) = bi} and, by
definition of Lebesgue measure on trees, it holds that µt(B) = (
1
2)
k, as desired.
8. S2S extended with the path-category quantifier
As anticipated in the introduction, another interesting way to extend S2S with variants of
Friedman’s Category and Measure quantifiers is to restrict the quantification to range over
infinite branches (paths) of the full binary tree.
In this section we consider the extension of S2S with the category quantifier restricted
to path, henceforth denoted by ∀∗pi.
We first recall the definition of paths in the full binary tree.
Definition 8.1. A set X ⊆ {L, R}∗ of vertices in the full binary tree is a path if and only if:
(1) X contains the root , and
(2) if v ∈ X and w is a prefix of v then v ∈ X,
(3) if v ∈ X then either vL ∈ X or vR ∈ X, but not both.
We denote with P the collection of paths in the full binary tree.
Since every path is uniquely determined by an infinite sequence of directions (L or R),
there is a one-to-one correspondence between P and the space {L, R}ω which is homeomorphic
to the Cantor space.
It is easy to verify that P ⊆ T{0,1} is Lebesgue null (µt(P) = 0) and it is meager
as a subset of T{0,1}. However, since P is homeomorphic to the Cantor space, it makes
sense to consider the probability (i.e., Lebesgue measure µw) and Baire category of subsets
A ⊆ P ⊆ T{0,1} relative to P.
This leads to the following definition of the Category-path quantifier ∀∗pi.
L
(
∀∗piX.φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn)
)
=
{
t ∈ TΓ | the set {p ∈ P | φ(p, t′) holds}
)
is comeager in P
}
where Γ = {0, 1}n.
Our main result regarding the logic S2S + ∀∗pi is the following quantifier elimination
theorem.
Theorem 8.2. For every S2S + ∀∗pi formula φ one can effectively construct an semantically
equivalent S2S formula ψ.
Proof. A set of paths B ⊆ {L, R}ω is comeager if and only if there is a Gδ set G that is dense
in {L, R}ω and G ⊆ B. A simple argument (see, e.g., [22]) shows that G ⊆ {L, R}ω is a Gδ set
if and only if G is of the form [X] for a set X ⊆ {L, R}∗ where:
[X]
def
= {pi ∈ {L, R}ω | for infinitely many vertices v ∈ pi we have v ∈ X}.
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Therefore, ∀∗pipi. ϕ(pi) holds if and only if there exists a set of nodes X of the full binary
tree such that:
• for every node v there exists a node w such that v  w and w ∈ X (i.e. [X] is dense in
{L, R}ω),
• for every infinite branch pi, if there are infinitely many v ∈ X such that v ≺ pi then ϕ(pi)
holds (i.e., [X] ⊆ L(ϕ))
The whole above property is easily S2S-definable.
9. S2S extended with the path-measure quantifier
Following the ideas presented in the previous section, we now study the extension of S2S
with the path-measure quantifier ∀=1pi whose semantics is defined as follows:
L
(
∀=1pi X.φ(X,Y1, . . . , Yn)
)
=
{
t ∈ TΓ | µw
(
{p ∈ P | φ(p, t) holds}) = 1}
where Γ = {0, 1}n.
Therefore, the property of ∀=1pi X.φ holds if the property φ holds for almost all pahts p,
where “for almost all” means having probability 1 with respect to the Lebesgue measure µw
on {L, R}ω (and thus not with respect to µt on T{0,1}).
It is not immediately clear from the previous definition if the quantifier ∀=1pi can be
expressed in S2S + ∀=1. Indeed, as already observed, the set P of paths is Lebesgue null
with respect to the Lebesgue measure µt on T{0,1}, i.e., µt(P) = 0. Therefore the naive
definition
∀=1pi X.φ(X) = ∀=1X.
(
“X is a path” ∧ φ(X))
does not work. Indeed the S2S + ∀=1 formula on the right always defines the empty set
because the collection of X ∈ T{0,1} satisfying the conjunction is a subset of P and therefore
has µt measure 0.
Nevertheless the quantifier ∀=1pi can be expressed in S2S + ∀=1 with a more elaborate
encoding (Theorem 9.3 below). What is needed is a S2S definable continuous and measure
preserving function f mapping trees X ∈ T{0,1} to a paths f(X) ∈ P. We now prove that
such definable function exists.
Definition 9.1. Define the binary relation f(X,Y ) on T{0,1} by the following S2S formula:
“Y is a path” ∧ ∀y ∈ Y.∃z. (SuccL(y, z) ∧ (z ∈ Y ⇔ y ∈ X)).
Lemma 9.2. For every X ∈ T{0,1} there exists exactly one Y ∈ P ⊆ T{0,1} such that
f(X,Y ). Hence the relation f is a function f : T{0,1} → P. Furthermore f satisfies the
following properties:
(1) f is a continuous and surjective function,
(2) f is measure preserving, i.e., for every Borel set B ⊆ P it holds that µt(f−1(B)) =
µw(B).
Proof. The mapping f is well defined in the sense that Y is fully determined by the {0, 1}-
labeled tree X. Indeed, from the condition
∀y ∈ Y.∃z. (SuccL(y, z) ∧ (z ∈ Y ⇔ y ∈ X))
in Definition 9.1 it follows that for every vertex y ∈ Y , the set X determines if the unique
successor of y in Y is yL or yR (since Y is a path, it contains either yL or yR and not both)
MONADIC SECOND ORDER LOGIC WITH MEASURE AND CATEGORY QUANTIFIERS 25
depending on whether y∈X or y 6∈X, respectively. Since a finite prefix of Y is determined
by a finite subset of X, the mapping f is continuous. Furthermore, the function is surjective,
because for every path Y ∈P we can easily find some X such that f(X) = Y .
We now show that f is measure preserving, i.e., that µt(f
−1)(B) = µw(B). Since
Lebesgue measures are regular, it is sufficient to prove this property for basic clopen sets B.
Basic clopen sets are of the form Uv ⊆ P, for some v ∈ {L, R}∗, consisting of all infinite
paths extending the finite prefix v. We now show that µt(f
−1(Uv)) = µw(Uv) by induction
of the length |v| = n of the prefix v.
If n = 0 then v =  and Uv = P and therefore f−1(Uv) = T{0,1}. Hence we have
µt(f
−1(Uv)) = µw(Uv) = 1.
If n > 0 assume that v = wL (the case v = wR is similar) and that the inductive
hypothesis holds on Uw. By unfolding the definition of f we get that the preimage f
−1(Uv)
is the clopen set
f−1(Uv) = f−1(Uw) ∩ Uv=0
where Uv=0 = {t | t(v) = 0}. By definition of Lebesgue measure µt it holds that µt(Uv=0) = 12 .
Furthermore, since f−1(Uw) and Uv=0 are independent events, it holds that
µt(f
−1(Uw) ∩ Uv=0) = µt(f−1(Uw)) · 1
2
By inductive hypothesis on w we have that µt(f
−1(Uw)) = µw(Uw). Lastly, since v = wL,
we have µw(Uv) = µw(Uw) · 12 . Therefore the desired equality
µt(f
−1(Uv)) = µw(Uv)
holds.
We are now ready to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 9.3. For every S2S+∀=1pi formula φ(Z1, . . . , Zn) there exists a S2S+∀=1 formula
φ′(Z1, . . . , Zn) such that φ and φ′ denote the same set.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the complexity of ψ with the interesting case being
φ(Z1, . . . , Zn) = ∀=1pi Y. ψ(Y,Z1, . . . , Zn). By induction hypothesis on ψ, there exists a
S2S+∀=1 formula ψ′ defining the same set as ψ. Then the S2S+∀=1 formula φ′ corresponding
to φ is defined as follows:
φ′(Z1, . . . , Zn) = ∀=1X.
(∃Y. (f(X,Y ) ∧ ψ′(Y, Z1, . . . , Zn)))
We now show that φ and φ′ indeed define the same set. The following are equivalent:
(1) The tuple (t1, . . . , tn) satisfies the formula ∀=1pi Y.ψ(Y,Z1, . . . , Zn),
(2) (by the definition of ∀=1pi X) The set A =
{
t ∈ P | ψ(t, t1, . . . , tn)
}
is such that µw(A) = 1,
(3) (by Lemma 9.2) The set B ⊆ T{0,1}, defined as B = f−1(A), i.e., as
B =
{
X ∈ T{0,1} | ∃Y.
(
f(X,Y ) ∧ ψ(Y, t1, . . . , tn)
)}
is such that µT{0,1}(B) = 1.
(4) (by the definition of ∀=1 and assumption ψ = ψ′) the tuple (t1, . . . , tn) satisfies
∀=1X. (∃Y. (f(X,Y ) ∧ φ′(Y, #»Z))).
The result of the previous theorem can be simply stated as S2S + ∀=1pi ⊆ S2S + ∀=1.
The next result states that S2S + ∀=1pi is strictly more expressive that S2S.
Theorem 9.4. The strict inequality S2S ( S2S + ∀=1pi holds.
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Before proving this result, as a preliminary step, we introduce the following S2S + ∀=1pi
definable language of trees.
Definition 9.5. Let U=1 ⊆ T{0,1} be the set of {0, 1}-labeled trees t satisfying the formula
U=1(X) defined by:
U=1(X) = ∀=1pi Y.(Y ∩X is finite).
In other words U=1 is the collection of subsets X of the full binary tree such that the
set of paths having only finitely many vertices in X has Lebesgue measure 1 in P.
The following proposition states that every S2S + ∀=1pi formula is equivalent to a S2S
formula which, additionally, can use the additional predicate over trees U=1.
Proposition 9.6. The equality S2S + ∀=1pi = S2S + U=1 holds. That is, every S2S + ∀=1pi
formula φ is effectively equivalent to a S2S + U=1 formula.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the structure of φ(X1, . . . , Xn). The only interesting
case is with ϕ of the form ∀=1pi Y.ψ(Y,X1, . . . , Xn).
We can assume, from the inductive hypothesis on ψ, that ψ(Y,X1, . . . , Xn) is expressible
in S2S + U=1.
By regularity of measures on Polish spaces a set of paths B ⊆ {L, R}ω has measure 1 if
and only if there is an Fσ set F ⊆ B such that F has measure 1. A standard argument (cf.
proof of Theorem 8.2, see also [22]) shows, that F ⊆ {L, R}ω is a Fσ set if and only if F is of
the form [Y ] for a set Y ⊆ {L, R}∗ with
[Y ]
def
= {pi ∈ {L, R}ω | there are only finitely many v ∈ pi such that v ∈ Y }.
Therefore, ∀=1pi pi. ψ( ~X) holds if and only if there exists a set of vertuces Y such that:
• the set of paths [Y ] has measure 1, and
• [Y ] ⊆ L(ψ( ~X).
Notice that the first property is expressible as U=1(Y ) and the second is easily S2S-definable.
We now show that the language U=1 is not definable in S2S. The proof is obtained by
adapting the argument of Theorem 21 in [8].
Proposition 9.7. The language U=1 is not S2S definable.
Proof. A key property of S2S definable sets A ⊆ T{0,1} is that A is not empty if and only if A
contains a regular tree, that is a tree having only infinitely many subtrees up-to isomorphism.
To prove that U=1 is not S2S definable we will specify a S2S definable language L
and show that U=1 ∩ L is not empty and does not contain any regular tree. This of course
implies that U=1 is not S2S definable because S2S definable sets are closed under Boolean
operations.
We define L ⊆ T{0,1} as the set of trees over the alphabet Σ = {0, 1} satisfying the S2S
formula φ(X) defined as:
φ(X) = ∀x.∃y.(x ≤ y ∧ y ∈ X)}
In other words, a set of vertices t ∈ T{0,1} of the full binary tree satisfies φ(X) if from
every vertex v there exists a descendant vertex w such that w ∈ t.
We now show that U=1 ∩ L is not empty and does not contain a regular tree.
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Claim 9.8. U=1 ∩ L is not empty.
Proof. We exhibit a concrete tree t ∈ T{0,1} in U=1 ∩ L. To do this, fix any mapping
f : N → N such that f(0)=0 and for all n > 0 holds f(n) > n+∑n−1i=0 f(i). We say that
a vertex v∈{0, 1}∗ of the full binary tree belongs to the n-th block if its depth |v| is such
that f(n) ≤ |v| < f(n+ 1). Each block can be seen as a forest of finite trees (see Figure 6)
of depth f(n + 1) − f(n). We now describe the tree t. For each n, all nodes of the n-th
block are labeled by 0 except the leftmost vertices of each (finite) tree in the block (seen as
a forest), which are labeled by 1. Figure 6 illustrates this idea. Clearly t is in L.
Let En be the random event (on the space P of infinite branches of the full binary
tree) of a path having the f(n+ 1)-th vertex labeled by 1. Then, by construction of t, the
(Lebesgue measure µw) probability of En is exactly
1
2f(n+1)−f(n) .
This implies that µ(E0) + µ(E1) + . . . ≤
∑∞
n=0
1
2f(n+1)−f(n) ≤ 12 + . . . + 12n ≤ 1. The
Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that the probability of infinitely many events En happening
is 0. Hence the probability of the set of paths having infinitely many 1’s is 0. Therefore
t∈U=1 and thus t∈L ∩ U=1.
b
1 00 . . .. . .
1 00 . . .. . . 1 00 . . .. . .
Figure 6: A prefix of a tree t ∈ L ∩ U=1 up to the level f(2).
Claim 9.9. L ∩ U=1 does not contain any regular tree t.
Proof. Indeed, let G be the finite graph whose vertices are labeled by 0 or 1 and where each
vertex can reach exactly two vertices. Then t represents a regular tree t ∈ T{0,1}. We can
view G as a finite Markov chain where all edges have probability 12 . From the assumption
that t∈L, we know that every vertex in G can reach a vertex labeled 1. By elementary
results of Markov chains, a random infinite path in G will almost surely visit infinitely many
times states labeled by 1 and this is a contradiction with the hypothesis that t∈U=1.
The proofs of the above two Claims finish the proof of the Proposition.
The results of Proposition 9.6 and Proposition 9.6 together prove the claim of Theo-
rem 9.4.
On Qualitative Automata of Carayol, Haddad, and Serre. In a recent paper [8]
Carayol, Haddad, and Serre have considered a probabilistic interpretation of standard (Rabin)
nondeterministic tree automata. Below we briefly discuss this interpretation referring to [8]
(see also [23, Chapter 8]) for more details.
The classical interpretation from [22] of a nondeterministic tree automaton A over the
alphabet Σ is the set L(A)⊆TΣ of trees t∈TΣ such that there exists a run ρ of t on A such
that for all paths pi in ρ, the path pi is accepting. The probabilistic interpretation in [8]
associates to each nondeterministic tree automaton the language L=1(A)⊆TΣ of trees t∈TΣ
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such that there exists a run ρ of X on A such that for almost all paths pi in ρ, the path pi is
accepting, where “almost all” means having Lebesgue measure (µw relative to the space P
of paths) equal to 1 .
It is clear that for every automaton A the language L=1(A) can be defined in the logic
S2S + ∀=1pi . Specifically, if Σ = {1, . . . , 2n}, the formula ψA(X1, . . . , Xn) defined as
ψA(
#»
X) = ∃ #»Y .(“ #»Y is a run of #»X on A” ∧ ∀=1pi Z.(“Z is an accepting path of #»Y ”))
defines L=1(A), where the subformulas “ #»Y is a run of #»X on A” and “ #»Y is a run of #»X on A”
are defined as expected (see, e.g., [26]).
On the other hand, Carayol, Haddad and Serre have shown in [8, Example 7] that there
are regular (i.e., S2S definable) sets of trees which are not of the form L=1(A). Therefore
there are S2S + ∀=1pi languages not definable by automata with probabilistic interpretation.
As we have shown in Proposition 9.6, the (effective) equality S2S + ∀=1pi = S2S + U=1
holds. Interestingly, the (not regular) language U=1 is definable by tree automata with
probabilistic interpretation of [8]. Hence, S2S + ∀=1pi can be understood as the minimal
extension of S2S which is sufficiently expressive to define all the languages definable by tree
automata with probabilistic interpretation.
A crucial property of languages definable by tree automata with probabilistic interpre-
tation is that if L=1(A) 6= ∅ then L=1(A) contains a regular tree. As we have shown in the
proof of Theorem 9.7 (claim 2), this useful property does not hold for S2S + ∀=1pi definable
languages.
10. Open Problems
In this concluding section we present a list of problems left open from this work. This is
by no means exhaustive and simply reflects the authors’ view on what might be the most
important, difficult and far-reaching questions encountered in the process of working on
these topics.
Problem 1. Is the theory of S2S + ∀∗ decidable?
The stronger statement S2S = S2S+∀∗ was formulated as a theorem in [18] but, as discussed
in the Introduction and Section 6), the proof contained a mistake. The proof is correct only
for languages defined by game automata.
Problem 2. It is well known that S2S definable sets always belong to the ∆12 class of the
projective hierarchy. Is this also true for S2S + ∀∗ definable sets?
Problem 3. In terms of reverse mathematics as shown in [17], decidability of the theory
S2S is equivalent to determinacy of all Gale–Stewart games with the winning condition being
a Boolean combination of Fσ sets (see [17] for a precise formulation). Is this characterization
also valid for S2S + ∀∗?
Problem 4. Is the theory S2S + ∀=1pi decidable?
Problem 5. Are S2S+∀=1pi definable sets always contained in the ∆12 class of the projective
hierarchy. All the examples of S2S + ∀=1pi definable sets which are not S2S definable we
have considered (e.g., the language U=1) are contained in the ∆12 class.
Problem 6. Design an algorithm which for a given S2S definable set computes its measure.
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